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ABSTRACT 
 
Light Water Reactors (LWR), which represent the most common reactor in 
operation and under construction, have an average thermal efficiency of 
about 33%-35%, therefore two third of the thermal energy produced by the 
nuclear reaction is typically wasted. The literature presents many possible 
applications of this thermal energy, however most of them are not feasible 
because of economic and legislative constraints: among the others the 
Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) is one of the most critic. The EPZ is the 
area surrounding the Nuclear Power Plants (NPP) subject to specific rules 
constraining the development of the area. These constraints avoid the 
complete exploitation of the energy produced by the power plants. 
Small Medium Nuclear Reactors (SMR) can offset some of the constraints 
since they are intrinsically safer and therefore can theoretically require a 
smaller EPZ. This chapter deals with the relationships among the 
Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ), the reactor size and the possibilities of 
cogeneration. After a review of the constraints for the EPZ in the different 
countries it show the relationship among EPZ and NPP size and presents 
the various options of nuclear cogenerations. These options are evaluated 
according to the commercial feasibility of the different technologies 




A nuclear power plant (NPP) considered as a whole presents some by-
products that can be exploited to create interesting synergies between the 
plant itself and potential nearby facilities. These by-products can be 
ascribed directly or indirectly to the nuclear plant: 
 Directly if they derive from the nuclear reactor itself; 
 Indirectly if they are due to the presence of the nuclear power station 
and, consequently, to the features of the location, the need of ancillary 
installations or the safety measures required by the NPP. 
The main issue is whether - and how - these by-products can be harnessed 
in order to increase both the economic attractiveness and the social 
acceptability of the nuclear power plant. 
The average electric efficiency of a Light Whater Reactor (LWR), the 
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EPR, AP1000, ABWR, IRIS etc…) is about 33%. These  two thirds of the 
thermal power produced by the reactor are wasted in the environment 
while converting heat into electricity. The “wasted” heat can be used in a 
co-generation mode for several purposes, depending mainly on the outlet 
temperature of the reactor (and, consequently, on the reactor type). Co-
generation allows achieving overall efficiencies (thermal and electrical) up 
to 85%. This means that the primary energy used to produce at the same 
time heat and electricity is much lower than the primary energy that would 
be required to produce separately the same amounts of heat and electricity. 
Moreover, the cost of heat production is lower if compared to the separate 
mode, because of the availability of an almost free heat source. Finally, the 
consumption of fossil fuels for heat production is strongly reduced: this 
leads to reduced greenhouse gas emissions. 
Depending on the reactor type, it is possible to combine applications 
operating at low or high temperature. Low temperature applications 
basically belong to three categories: district heating (for residential, 
commercial or agricultural use), desalination and process heat delivery to 
factories with low-temperature requirements. High temperature 
applications are more innovative and can be subdivided into: hydrogen 
production (in order to store and distribute energy), process heat for 
industries that operate at high temperatures, oil shale extraction and 
biomass gasification or other fuel syntheses. Potential nuclear heat 
applications are described in section 2. 
Nuclear legislation prescribes mandatory safety measures, such as 
Emergency Planning Zones (EPZs) and site selection criteria. As a 
consequence, NPPs are usually placed in scarcely populated areas, 
surrounded by kilometres of unused land.  In particular, the EPZ around a 
nuclear plant causes major impediments to human activities and industrial 
uses of the site, as it imposes measures such as the possibility of a total 
evacuation in case of an accident. The current challenge is to reduce the 
width of emergency zones, making them proportional to the safety and 
size of the reactor. Therefore, EPZs for new reactors belonging to 
Generations III+ and IV are likely to have a smaller extension than 
traditional reactors, however, this is not sure. Moreover, nuclear legislation 
differs from country to country, and some governments could decide to 
maintain standard EPZ sizes even for innovative reactors. If such 
reductions won’t be possible, the mentioned areas should then be exploited 
in the most profitable way. These areas can be employed with applications 
that require wide extensions of ground but that do not require a high 
human density, such as industrial parks, or farming installations for the 
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photovoltaic or wind turbines, depending on the meteorological conditions 
of the site. Particular attention has been posed on the EPZ topic, which is 
developed in the next sections 
 
In order to identify possible applications to harness the by-products of a 
NPP, it is necessary to understand what implications the construction of a 
NPP would bring, both on the human and the industrial development of 
the surrounding areas. For example, it is important to know the minimum 
distance at which people can be settled, the allowed density, and whether 
there are legislations that a priori exclude the development of certain 
applications, as the related facilities interacting with the NPP are 
considered too hazardous. 
The analysis starts from the risk zoning around a NPP and the site 
selection criteria for its construction. Risk zoning is the identification of 
diverse EPZs (Emergency Planning Zones) around the NPP, where 
particular safety measures have to be taken: this chapter gives the official 
definition of EPZs and describes the risk zones around a NPP, according 
standards set by the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) and the 
NUREG (NUclear REGulation of the USA), in order to supply a 
regulatory frame. Then, it describes the current status of EPZs in many 
countries. Thus, it notice that, despite suggestions provided by 
international legislations, each country can decide its own EPZ features, 
and the risk zoning methods vary significantly from country to country: 
international regulations are rather guidelines that can be taken as 
reference. It goes trough the site selection criteria in order to identify 
constraints and rules for the siting of a NPP and for population and 
industrial development in the adjacent areas. The main idea that emerged 
is that the presence of a particular facility cannot be excluded a priori: 
international standards state that although a facility may be regarded as 
potentially hazardous, its feasibility has to be investigated and justified 
through economic, environmental, safety and technical factors. It is also 
necessary to analyze its interaction with the NPP in order to definitively 
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1 SECTION ONE: THE EPZ 
 
1.1 IAEA’s definition of EPZ  
 
The IAEA (IAEA, 2003) defines three threat categories of nuclear reactors 
reported in Table 1. 
For most accident types, emergency response takes place over two distinct 
areas: 
1. On-site area: it is the area surrounding the facility and within the 
security perimeter, fence or other designated property marker. 
This area is under the immediate control of the facility or 
operator; 
2. Off-site area: it is the area beyond the on-site area. For facilities 
with the potential for emergencies resulting in major off-site 
releases or exposures (threat categories I and II), the level of 
planning will vary depending on the distance from the facility, as 
explained later. 
The threat category of nuclear reactors depends on their power, as shown 











I Facilities, such as NPPs, for which on-site events 
(including very low probability events) are postulated 
that could give rise to severe deterministic health effects 
off the site, or for which such events have occurred in 
similar facilities. 
II Facilities, such as some types of research reactors, for 
which on-site events are postulated that could give rise to 
radiation doses to people off the site that warrant urgent 
protective actions in accordance with international 
standards, or for which such events have occurred in 
similar facilities.  
III Facilities, such as industrial irradiation facilities, for 
which on-site events are postulated that could give rise to 
radiation doses that warrant or contamination that 
warrants urgent protective actions on the site, or for 
which such events have occurred in similar facilities. 

















Off site: Emergencies involving severe 
core damage have the potential for 
causing severe deterministic health 
effects, including deaths. Radiation doses 
in excess of the urgent GILs (Generic 
Intervention Levels) are possible more 
than 5 km from the facility. Deposition 
resulting in radiation doses in excess of 
the relocation GILs and ingestion GALs 
(Generic Action Levels) is possible at 
great distances from the facility. An 
emergency not involving core damage has 
only a small potential for exceeding 
urgent GILs. 
 
On site: For core damage emergencies, 
doses sufficient to result in severe 
deterministic health effects, including 
deaths, are possible. 
I or II 
2 – 100 
MWth 
Off site: Radiation doses due to inhalation 
of short lived iodine in excess of urgent 
GILs are possible if cooling of the core is 
lost (core melt). 
 
On site: Potential for radiation doses in 
excess of urgent GILs if fuel cooling is 
lost. If shielding is lost, direct shine dose 
could exceed urgent GILs or result in 
severe deterministic health effects. 
II or III 
< 2 MWth 
Off site: No potential for radiation doses 
in excess of urgent GILs. 
 
On site: Potential for radiation doses in 
excess of urgent GILs from inhalation 
(depending on design) if fuel cooling is 
lost. If shielding is lost, direct shine dose 
could exceed urgent GILs or result in 
severe deterministic health effects. 
III 
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Reactors with a power greater than 100 MWt (i.e. 33 MWe) will account 
for almost the totality of the market. Such designs include large reactors 
(LR) such as EPR Areva or AP 1000 by Westinghouse (about 4.500 
MWth), or even small-medium reactors (SMR) like IRIS (335MWe - 
1.000 MWth LWR). Moreover, all the reactors currently used in electro-
nuclear power plants belong to category I. Thus, the chapter will only take 
into account EPZs for category I facilities. 
Emergency planning (EP) for category I plants is the most demanding. 
According to the IAEA, planning and implementing the capabilities to 
handle emergencies in category I facilities will ensure that the capability 
exists to handle events belonging to the other categories. However, for on-
site and local organizations, planning and implementation should be based 
on local practices and activities (IAEA, 1997). As concerns off-site 
facilities, emergency planning can be discussed for two EPZs, as 
illustrated in Figure 3 and described as follows (IAEA, 2003).  
 
Figure 3  – Concept of Emergency Zone (IAEA, 2003) 
 
Precautionary action zone (PAZ) 
This is a pre-designated area around a facility in threat category I, where 
urgent protective actions has been pre-planned and will be implemented 
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substantially reduce the risk of severe deterministic health effects by 
taking protective action within this zone before or shortly after a release.  
 
Urgent protective action Planning Zone (UPZ) 
This is a pre-designated area around a facility in threat category I or II. 
Inside the UPZ, preparations are made to promptly implement urgent 
protective actions based on environmental monitoring data and assessment 
of facility conditions, the goal being to avert radiation doses specified in 
international standards.  
 
Long term protective action Planning Zone (LPZ) 
It is the furthest pre-designated area around a facility and includes the 
UPZ. It is the area where preparations for the effective implementation of 
protective actions to reduce the long-term radiation dose from deposition 
and ingestion should be developed in advance (IAEA, 1997). When the 
IAEA-TECDOC 953 was updated in 2003, LPZ was replaced with “Food 
Restriction Zone”, as shown by comparing Figures 4 and 5. 
As pointed out later, only the PAZ and the UPZ as belonging to the EPZ, 
excluding the LPZ (or FRZ), because it does not impose evacuation 
planning. 
EPZs should be roughly circular areas around the facility, their boundaries 
defined by local landmarks (e.g. roads or rivers) to allow easy 
identification during a response. It is important to note that the zones do 
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Figure 5 – Emergency zones and radii updated (IAEA, 2003) 
 
The size of the zones has to be determined by an analysis of the potential 
consequences following an accident. However, previous studies ((NRC, 
1990) and (NRC, 1988)) of a full range of radiological and nuclear 
accidents provide a basis for generic zone sizes, as summarized in Table 3. 
It must be noticed that these suggestions are provided with recognition of 
the great uncertainties involved and variation by a factor of two or more 
during application is reasonable. The choice of the suggested radii 
represents a judgment of the distance to which it is reasonable to make 
advanced arrangements in order to ensure effective response. In a 
particular emergency zone, protective actions may be warranted only in a 
small part of the zones. For the worst possible emergencies, protective 


















LPZ Radius (*) FRZ 
Radius 
I > 1000 
MWth 
3-5 km 25 km 50-100 km 300 km 
I 100-1000 
MWth 
0.5-3 km 5-25 km 50-100 km 50-300 
km 
(*) LPZ has been substituted with FRZ (Food Restriction Zone) 
 
Table 3 – Suggested emergency zones and radii for threat category I and II 
(adapted from (IAEA, 2003) and (IAEA, 1997)) 
 
The suggested sizes for the PAZ were based on expert judgment 
considering the following (IAEA, 2003): 
 urgent protective actions taken before or shortly after a release 
within this radius will prevent radiation doses above the early 
death thresholds for the vast majority of severe emergencies 
postulated for these facilities; 
 urgent protective actions taken before or shortly after a release 
within this radius will avert radiation doses; 
 radiation dose rates that could have been fatal within a few hours 
were observed at these distances during the Chernobyl accident; 
 the maximum reasonable radius for the PAZ is assumed to be 5 
km because: 
 except for the most severe emergencies, it is the limit to 
which early deaths are postulated; 
 it provides about a factor of ten reduction in the radiation 
dose compared to the dose on the site; 
 it is very unlikely that urgent protective actions will be 
warranted at a significant distance beyond this radial distance; 
 it is considered the practical limit of the distance to which 
substantial sheltering or evacuation can be promptly 
implemented before or shortly after a release; 
 implementing precautionary urgent protective actions to a 
larger radius may reduce the effectiveness of the action for 
people near the site, who are at the greatest risk. 
The suggested sizes for the UPZ are based on expert judgment considering 
the following (IAEA, 2003): 
 these are the radial distances at which monitoring to locate and 
evacuate hot spots (deposition) within hours/days may be 
warranted in order to significantly reduce the risk of early deaths 
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 at these radial distances there is a reduction in concentration (and 
thus risk) by a factor of 10 of a radiation release, compared to the 
concentration at the PAZ boundary; 
 this distance provides a substantial base for expansion of response 
efforts; 
 25 km is assumed to be the practical limit for the radial distance 
within which to conduct monitoring and implement appropriate 
urgent protective actions within a few hours or days. Attempting 
to conduct initial monitoring to a larger radius may reduce the 
effectiveness of the protective actions for the people near the site, 
who are at the greatest risk; 
 under average meteorological (dilution) conditions, for most 
postulated severe emergencies, the total effective radiation dose 
for an individual beyond this radius would not exceed the urgent 
protective actions for evacuation. 
This chapter reports only the information about the suggested sizes of PAZ 
and UPZ distances, and not those about LPZ and FRZ, because only the 
PAZ and the UPZ impose safety measures such as evacuation, that limit 
the presence of people thus posing impediments on the development of 
applications that require a high density of personnel/users at a short 
distance from the plant. Even though this chapter considers the PAZ and 
the UPZ, the radius of the zone that imposes evacuation can reach 25 km. 
Anyway, these distances are just a suggestions, and they are probably the 
results of very conservative criteria. It will be proved in section 1.3.1. that 
such a long distance for evacuation is taken into consideration by very few 
countries. 
 
1.2 Definition of EPZ by NRC 
NRC (Nuclear Regulatory Commission, USA) developed the most 
important reference documents for risk zoning around a NPP and 
emergency planning zones (NRC, 1998; NRC, 2003; NRC, 1998). 
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Figure 6 – 10CFR100 requirements  (NRC, 1962) 
 
Exclusion Area (EA or EAB) 
It is the area surrounding the reactor, where the reactor licensee retains the 
authority to determine all activities, including exclusion or removal of 
personnel and property from the area. This area could be traversed by a 
highway, railroad, or waterway, if they do not interfere with normal 
operations of the facility and it is possible to control traffic on the 
highway, railroad, or waterway, in case of emergency, to protect the public 
health and safety. Residence within the exclusion area shall normally be 
prohibited. In any event, residents shall be subject to ready removal in case 
of necessity. Activities unrelated to operation of the reactor may be 
permitted in an exclusion area under appropriate limitations, provided that 
no significant hazards to the public health and safety will result (NRC, 
2003). 
The EA size is not fixed: it must be of such size that an individual located 
at any point on its boundary for two hours immediately following onset of 
the postulated fission product release would not receive a total radiation 
dose to the whole body in excess of 25 rem or a total radiation dose in 
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EA size involves consideration of the atmospheric characteristics of the 
site as well as plant design (NRC, 2003). 
The concept of Exclusion Area originated in the USA in the early 1950s, 
when an acute awareness existed about the potential effects of nuclear 
accidents on the nearby population. This idea was mooted primarily to 
insulate the public from the harmful effects of low-probability, high-
consequence accidents. The earliest attempt to size the EA (the so called 
“rule of thumb”) was made by NRC (NRC, 1950): the exclusion distance 
was numerically specified as a circle of radius  [miles], 
where P is the reactor thermal power (kW). This formula would not yield 
practical sizes for medium-sized or large power reactors: for a typical 3000 
MWth reactor, this formulation gives an exclusion radius of 17.3 miles 
(27.9 km). Thus, the US siting practice as embodied in 10 CFR Part 100 
for the determination of the exclusion boundary and the low population 
zone around a reactor, updated in 2003 (NRC, 2003), lately defined these 
radial distances in a more correct way, based on the radiation dose after an 
accident. The methodology for implementing this in the US Context is 
coded in the NRC document TID-14844  (NRC, 1962).  
When implemented, the exclusion distances for most US reactors fall in 
the range of 0.5–1.6 km.  
The factors determining the exclusion boundary are: reactor type and 
power, engineered safety features, containment design and characteristics 
of the site. The US code of practice assumes a severe beyond design basis 
accident and does not give credit to design features save the containment 
(BARC, 1975). 
Some examples of Exclusion Area Boundaries (EAB) recently assessed for 
different reactors are the following: 
1. ABWR (Lungmen nuclear project, Taiwan, expected to be 
commissioned in July 2010): in the Preliminary Safety Analysis 
Report it is stated “the distance from the centre of reactor building 
to the EAB is 300 m. There are no waterways, railroad, or public 
highways that traverse the boundary of the exclusion area”(AEC, 
2005); 
2. CANDU: “because of the lower design leak rate from 
containment, the EAB radius for the siting of CANDU 9 can be as 
small as 500 m, significantly reducing site area requirements for 
CANDU 9 plants. This is an important advantage in the context of 








16          G. Locatelli and M. Mancini 
3. EPR: “Site boundary considerations for new nuclear Darlington 
(Canada)” considers ACR-1000, EPR and AP-1000 reactors. EPR 
meet the dose acceptance criteria from RD-337 with an EAB of 
500 m (OPG, 2009). 
 
Low Population Zone (LPZ) 
It is the area immediately surrounding the exclusion area which contains 
residents, the total number and density of which are such that there is a 
reasonable probability that appropriate protective measures could be taken 
in their behalf in the event of a serious accident. These guides do not 
specify a permissible population density or total population within this 
zone because the situation may vary from case to case. Whether a specific 
number of people can, for example, be evacuated from a specific area, or 
instructed to take shelter, on a timely basis will depend on many factors 
such as location, number and size of highways, scope and extent of 
advance planning, and actual distribution of residents within the area.  
The LPZ size is not fixed. It must be of such size that: 
1. an individual located at any point on its outer boundary who is 
exposed to the radioactive cloud resulting from the postulated 
fission product release (during the entire period of its passage) 
would not receive a total radiation dose to the whole body in 
excess of 25 rem or a total radiation dose in excess of 300 rem to 
the thyroid from iodine exposure; 
2. the population centre distance (distance from the reactor to the 
nearest boundary of a densely populated centre containing more 
than about 25,000 residents) is at least one and one-third times the 
distance from the reactor to the outer boundary of the LPZ. 
The boundary of the population centre should be determined considering 
population distribution, not political boundaries. Where very large cities 
are involved, a greater distance may be necessary because of total 
integrated population dose consideration. The size of the LPZ depends 
upon atmospheric dispersion characteristics and population characteristics 
of the site, as well as aspects of plant design. (NRC, 2003) 
For plants licensed in USA in the 1960s and early 1970s a LPZ radius of 
about 5 km was found acceptable. (BARC, 1975) 
The TID-14844 (NRC, 1962) provides the distances needed for the 
exclusion area, the LPZ and the population centre as a function of the 
thermal power of the LWR to be sited at a particular location. These 
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Plume Exposure Pathway and Ingestion Exposure Pathway Zones 
To facilitate a pre-planned strategy for protective actions during a 
radiological emergency, there are two emergency planning zones around 
each NPP (NRC, 1998). The exact size and shape of each zone is a result 
of detailed planning which includes consideration of the specific 
conditions at each site, unique geographical features of the area, and 
demographic information. This pre-planned strategy for an emergency 
planning zone provides a substantial basis to support activity beyond the 
planning zone in the extremely unlikely event it would be needed. The two 
zones are described as follows and in Table 4: 
 
1. Plume Exposure Pathway zone (PEP): the PEP zone has a radius 
of about 16 km (10 miles) from the reactor site. Predetermined 
protective action plans are in place for this zone and are designed 
to avoid or reduce radiation dose from potential exposure of 
radioactive materials. These actions include sheltering, 
evacuation, and the use of potassium iodide where appropriate. 
The principal exposure sources from these pathways are: 
a. whole body external exposure to gamma radiation from 
the plume and from deposited materials; 
b. inhalation exposure from the passing radioactive plume. 
The duration of principal potential exposures could range in 
length from hours to days. Figure 9 depicts a typical 10-mile PEP 
zone map. The centre of the map is the location of the commercial 
NPP reactor building. Concentric circles of 2, 5, and 10 miles 
have been drawn and divided into triangular sectors identified by 
letters from A to R. Municipalities identified to be within the 10-
mile PEP have been assigned numbers from 1 to 24. The 
triangular sectors provide a method of identifying which 
municipalities are affected by the radioactive plume as it travels  
2. Ingestion Exposure Pathway zone (IEP): the IEP has a radius of 
about 50 miles (80 km) from the reactor site. Predetermined 
protective action plans are in place for this zone and are designed 
to avoid or reduce radiation doses from potential ingestion of 
radioactive materials. These actions include a ban of contaminated 
food and water. The principal exposure from this pathway would 
be from ingestion of contaminated water or foods such as milk or 
fresh vegetables. The duration of principal exposures could range 
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PEP Whole body (external radiation) 
Thyroid (inhalation) 
Other organs (inhalation) 
About 16 
km 
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Figure 9 – Typical 10-mile PEP zone map (NRC, 1998) 
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1.3 EPZs worldwide 
 
1.3.1 Differences in EPZ regulations around the world 
Current regulations vary among IAEA Member States. They either 
prescribe the EPZ size through a deterministic, or a risk-based approach, 
or appear as some combination thereof. The technical basis is not always 
clearly spelled out (IAEA, 2005). 
Around nuclear installations, planning zones for the implementation of 
countermeasures are pre-established, but their sizes vary among different 
countries: 
 the planning zone for evacuation is, in general, in the order of 10 
km around the nuclear installation; 
 the planning zones for sheltering and stable iodine are generally 
of the same size, and range from 10-20 km, larger than the 
evacuation zones. Choosing identical planning zones indicates 
that sheltering and stable iodine are often implemented together. 
In all cases, zone sizes are based on detailed analyses of possible 
accidents, their severity and consequences (OECD/NEA, 2003). 
In Table 5, an overview of the current practices for risk zoning around 
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Country Zones 
Australia 
Zone 1: 500 m pre-planned evacuation zone 
Zone 2: 2.2 km (dependant upon conditions) 
ANSTO exclusion zone – 1.6 km 
Belgium Evacuation: 10 km 
Canada 
Evacuation zone: 7 km 
Sheltering zone: 10 km 
Iodine zone: 10 km 
Czech 
Republic 
NPP Dukovany: 10 km evacuation zone, 20 km sheltering 
and stable iodine zone 
NPP Temelin: 5 km evacuation zone, 13 km sheltering and 
stable iodine zone 
Finland 
Protective zone: 5 km distance from the facility 
EPZ: extending to about 20 km from the facility 
France 
Evacuation: 5 km 
EPZ (sheltering and iodine): 10 km 
Germany 
Central Zone: Surrounds the nuclear facility in a 2 km radius. 
Intermediate Zone: A circle with a radius of up to about 10 
km around the NPP 
Outer Zone: A circle with a radius of up to about 25 km 
around the NPP 
Hungary 
Internal zone: 3 km 
Sheltering zone, where evacuation can be considered: 31 km 
Zone where sheltering can be considered: 71 km 
Japan 
Sheltering zone, including evacuation zone (for NPPs): 8 to 
10 km 
Luxembourg 
Iodine: up to 25 km 
Evacuation and sheltering: case by case decision 
Netherlands 
Radius Implementation zone around the NPP: 
<100 MWe: 5 km 
100-500 MWe: 10 
km 
>500 MWe: 15 km 
Radius Countermeasure zones for the respective MWe, 
distance from the NPP: 
Evacuation 
0 5 5 
Iodine prophylaxis 
4 10 15 
Sheltering 
7 20 30 
In a segment depending on the wind direction. For 
evacuation > 100 MWe always also in a circle with 2 km 
radius 
Norway 
For two research reactors, zones are being established 
according to the draft IAEA Safety Series on emergency 
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Country Zones 
Slovakia 
Internal zone: 3 km for Bohunice 
Inner emergency zone: up to 12-15 km in radius around the 
NPP 
Indication zone: up to approximately 50 km in radius around 
the NPP 
EPZ: 30 km Bohunice, 20 km Mochovche (divided into 
zones of 5 and 10 km) 
South Africa 
Internal zone: 5 km 
UPZ: 5 to 16 km 
LPZ: 80 km 
Sweden 
Inner emergency zone: up to 12-15 km in radius around the 
NPP 
Indication zone: up to approximately 50 km in radius around 
the NPP 
Switzerland 
Internal zone: 3 to 5 km 
Zone 1: Approximately 4 km in radius around the NPP (= 
sheltering zone) 
Zone 2: Approximately 20 km in radius (= sheltering zone) 
United 
Kingdom 
1 to 3 km 
USA 
PEP Zone: 16 km 
IEP Zone: 80 km 
(*) Internal zone is generally defined as the zone in which no further 
development is allowed 
Table 5 – Overview of emergency planning practices in different countries 
(Kirchsteiger, 2006) and (OECD/NEA, 2003) 
 
 
In a recent paper the current status of the emergency and risk zones around 
a NPP has been analyzed for several countries. It pointed out that 
(Kirchsteiger, 2006): 
 many countries use the relevant IAEA documents (e.g. the 2003 
updated version of IAEA TECDOC 953); 
 there are significant differences in the EPZ radii in different 
countries, ranging from a few up to 80 km, as shown in Table 5; 
 there is a striking contrast in the extent of using probabilistic 
information to define EPZs between the nuclear and other high 
risk industry sectors, such as the chemical process industry, and 
the reasons for these differences are not entirely clear, since the 
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 the approach to emergency planning is, in general, strongly 
deterministic. The usual approach is that a reference accident is 
defined and used as a basis for drawing up the emergency plans; 
 the difference seems to be more related to risk perception than to 
actual risk potential; 
 there is a strong need to communicate risk information to the 
public both before and following an accident, and to educate the 
public so they can understand risk information in a comparative 
sense;the issue needs to be addressed on whether there are any 
advantages or disadvantages in imposing larger EZs. 
 
1.4  EPZ reduction and the role of small reactors 
The EPZ itself does not pose particular issues to the co-location of NPPs 
and other facilities, it imposes some limitations on the presence of people; 
reducing the EPZ would reduce this problem. According to INPRO 
(International project on innovative nuclear reactors and fuel) and GIF 
(Generation IV International Forum), innovative, small reactors could 
allow the reduction or even elimination of the EPZ. This section deals with 
the main issues linked to the presence of the EPZ, the motivations and 
goals for its reduction and the main advantages this would bring. 
Emergency planning requirements may represent a significant burden for 
the plant owner (utility), both in the construction and in the operating 
phases. During the construction, it may be necessary to build 
infrastructures (highways) to comply with the requirements. During 
operating phases, it is necessary to maintain an evacuation capability in a 
relatively wide area. Moreover, one of the consequences of emergency 
planning requirements is the “freezing” of any human development in a 
large area around the plant. Finally, the fact that the off-site zone around a 
NPP is subject to particular constraints may spread distrust towards 
nuclear power safety (Augutis, 2005). 
 
1.4.1 Attempts to reduce the EPZ 
Even though the concept of EPZ has been joined with nuclear power since 
the very beginning, many attempt to reduce it have been experimented 
(IAEA, 2006): 
1. in 1985, the licensee of the plant of Calvert Cliffs (Maryland) 
requested an EPZ reduction from ten to two miles, and in 1986 the 
plant of Seabrook (Texas) requested its reduction to one mile. Both 
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accident issues were still under study by the NRC and the latter 
because the supporting documentation did not contain sufficient 
justification. After these two early failures, there were no more 
licensee petitions, but rather studies and investigations continued, 
performed by various organizations, fuelled by the excellent safety 
record of operating plants and the enhanced safety characteristics of 
advanced reactors; 
2. in 1993, the NRC staff raised the following issue: “should advanced 
reactors with passive advanced design safety features be able to 
reduce EPZ and requirements?”. No changes were actually proposed, 
but it indicated that a revision of the EPZ was not impossible; 
3. in 1997, an evaluation of emergency planning for advanced reactors 
was conducted by the NRC in SECY-97-020, reaching the conclusion 
that the existing NUREG-0396 approach was also appropriate for the 
new plants, that were on the drawing boards. At the same time, 
however, it was recognized that “changes to emergency planning 
requirements might be warranted to account for the lower probability 
of severe accidents and the longer time period between accident 
initiation and release of radioactive material for most severe accidents 
associated with evolutionary and passive advanced LWRs”. In order 
to justify these types of changes, three main issues had to be 
addressed: 
1) Probability level below which accidents will not be 
considered for emergency planning (the so-called “cut-off 
probability”); 
2) Use of increased safety in one level of defence in depth to 
justify reducing requirements in another level; 
3) Acceptance by federal, state and local authorities. 
4. the task of Group 1 within the CRP i25001 (Coordinated Research 
Project on small reactors without on-site refuelling) is to develop a 
methodology and to identify regulatory approaches to revise (reduce 
or eliminate) off-site emergency measures such as evacuation and 
relocation for NPPs with innovative reactors. The general objective of 
Group 1 activities assumes there may be several equivalent, similar, or 
related practical implementations, such as to: 
 eliminate the need for off-site response; 
 revise the need for off-site relocation and evacuation 
measures; 
 reduce the size of the EPZ; 
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It is recognized that while the complete elimination of off-site EPZ may be 
difficult, eliminating or even reducing most costly measures may provide 
similar economic effects/benefits (IAEA, 2005). 
 
1.4.2 EPZ reduction/elimination goals 
The trend is to improve the level of safety for future NPPs (Generation IV 
reactors and small/medium reactors - SMR). This would significantly 
reduce the probability of severe accidents and releases of radioactive 
material from the plant. In principle, this could be considered to reduce, or 
perhaps eliminate, the need for emergency planning. Further 
considerations need to be given about how EP and EPZs may be defined 
for future NPPs where the risk in term of large off-site releases of 
radioactivity was much lower than in current plants. Consideration needs 
to be given on whether the moral obligation to provide an EP would 
outweigh the technical conclusion that EP would not be required any 
more. (Kirchsteiger, 2006) 
The idea of EPZ reduction for advanced nuclear reactors is based on two 
factors (Maioli, 2006): 
1. the safety level of new reactors: for example, in the case of IRIS, 
a LERF (Large Early Release Frequency) of 10-9 has been 
estimated; 
2. the fact that EP is based on risk perception rather than on a risk 
assessment. 
Elimination of EPZ is one of the goals of INPRO (International Project on 
Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles) and GIF (Generation IV 
International Forum): 
 IAEA TECDOC 1434 states that “innovative nuclear energy 
systems (INS) shall not need relocation or evacuation measures 
outside the plant site, apart from those generic emergency 
measures developed for any industrial facility”, which means that 
INS could be sited in very similar locations to those of other 
energy producing systems. The corresponding criterion is 
specified as “probability of large release of radioactive materials 
to the environment”, and the acceptance limit considered is <10-6 
per plant-year, or excluded by design, 
 it also suggests that the end point should be to make the risk of 
INS comparable to that of industrial facilities used for similar 
purposes, so that for INS there will be no need for relocation or 





27          G. Locatelli and M. Mancini 
 one of the goals of the GIF is to reach a condition with “no need 
for offsite response”. A reasonable measure of this goal could be 
expressed as “no credible accident scenarios that could result in 
offsite release of radiation exceeding US protection action 
guidelines. These guidelines may change as improved radiation 
dose-response models are developed” (IAEA, 2005). 
 
Achieving licensing without EPZs would offer significant societal and 
economic benefits to member countries, general public and plant 
owners/operators, including ((Augutis, 2005) and  (IAEA, 2006)): 
 no a priori impediment to further development and settlements in 
areas around the plant; 
 increased public acceptance of nuclear power, since NPPs would 
be treated as any other industrial facility; 
 reduced need for infrastructure to facilitate rapid evacuation, thus 
reducing connected costs; 
 reduced operational costs, since there would be no need for 
special training of personnel and for periodic evacuation drills; 
 enabling of co-generative applications, including district heating, 
desalination, industrial process heat supply, where the plant 
cannot be located remotely from the intended user (cost of 
extended transmission lines avoided); 
 enabling the choice of sites that would reduce transmission costs; 
 enabling a wider choice of sites in countries with relatively high 
population density.  
 
1.4.3 Correlation between size and EPZ dimension 
There is a correlation between the reactor size and the EPZ size. First of 
all, it must be underlined that the reactor size varies from country to 
country: some countries rely predominantly on large reactors, other 
countries on small ones, and finally some countries have a balanced mix. 
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Reactor size Countries 
Predominantly large (more than 
700 MW) 
Belgium, France, Germany, South 
Africa, USA 
Predominantly small (less than 
700 MW) 
Hungary, Netherlands, Slovakia, UK 
Mixed (small and large in the 
same proportion) 
Czech Republic, Finland, Japan, 
Switzerland, Canada 
Table 7 – Countries and reactor size adopted 
 
It is possible to divide EPZ sizes in three categories, as shown in table 8. 
The connection between the reactor size and the EPZ size for various 
countries is provided in table 8 and figure 12. The tendency is to establish 
large EPZs if LRs are employed and small EPZs for small reactors. There 
are no countries using small reactors that have large EPZ, but there are 




EPZ size Radius range Countries 
Small Less than 5 km Slovakia, Hungary, UK, Switzerland, 
France, Germany 
Large Between 5 and 10 
km 
Netherlands, Finland, Canada, Czech 
Republic, South Africa 
Very 
Large 
More than 10 km USA, Japan, Belgium 
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Figure 12 – Correlation between reactor size and EPZ size 
 
1.5 Conclusions 
The collected data demonstrate that: 
 EPZs size around a NPP are neither set by an international 
regulation, nor imposed by the reactor vendor or by other 
authorities; 
 the exact size and configuration of the EPZs should be determined 
with respect to local emergency response needs and capabilities, 
as they are affected by conditions as: atmospheric characteristics 
of the site, plant design, demography, topography, land 
characteristics, access routes, jurisdictional boundaries; 
 agencies like the IAEA and the NUREG tried to suggest typical 
sizes for EPZs, but all the suggestions are provided with 
recognition of the great uncertainties involved (a variation by a 
factor of two or more during application is reasonable) and in any 
case exact sizes must be confirmed by case-specific studies; 
 current EPZs are extremely different from country to country; 
 the determination the radius of an EPZ is related to the size (in 
terms of power) and to the level of safety of the reactor, but it has 
to be the result of a precise and complete case-by-case risk 
assessment analysis; 
 the guides do not specify a precise permissible population density 
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situation may vary from case to case: whether a specific number 
of people can be evacuated from a specific area on a timely basis 
will depend on many factors such as location, number and size of 
highways, as well as actual distribution of residents within the 
area; 
 the importance of EPZ reduction (in terms of off-site emergency 
planning elimination) for innovative small reactors with enhanced 
safety has been recognized, and it is based on the fact that: 
 it would lower the transmission cost for co-generative 
applications (district heating); 
 it would enable a wider choice of sites to locate NPP; 
 it would eliminate a priori impediments for the economic 
and human development in the area surrounding the 
plant; 
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The EPZ represents an inhibition to the urban and economic growth of the 
area within its borders; however, despite hindering the development of the 
territory as a whole, can also represents an attractive opportunity to single 
appliances: all the by-products of a NPP are available inside the EPZ 
perimeter, and the EPZ itself can be regarded as a valuable by-product, 
because its wide, uninhabited, low cost areas are the ideal location for 
many industrial/energetic facilities. 
This fact raises two major questions: 
1. What synergies do the nuclear by-products offer inside an EPZ? 
2. What industrial/energy applications could be implemented to 
exploit these synergies? 
This section tries to answer these two questions, identifying attractive 
synergies between nuclear power and different kinds of applications. In 
general co-generation is the simultaneous generation of heat and 
electricity; when a heat source is used to produce only electricity (e.g., 
through a steam turbine), about one third of the heat is converted, while 
the remaining two thirds are wasted. Part of this heat can be recovered 
extracting a certain amount of steam from the turbine. When the heat 
source is a nuclear reactor the issue is called nuclear cogeneration. 
Depending on the temperature reached in the reactor, nuclear co-
generation applications can be at low temperature or at high temperature. 
It is wise to divide the applications in two main group: low temperature 
and high temperature. 
 
2.2 Low temperature applications 
Low temperature applications presented in the following paragraphs are 
actual or viable in the short-term (5 years or less), thanks to the maturity of 
the employed technologies and to the commercial availability of nuclear 
reactors capable of providing heat at the needed temperature. Considerable 
experience has been accumulated worldwide both for nuclear-powered 
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2.2.1 Nuclear district heating 
In district heating the extracted steam from high and/or low-pressure 
turbines is fed to heat exchangers to produce hot water/steam, which is 
delivered to the consumers. Depending on the transportation distance and 
the number of end users, a certain number of pumping stations are located 
between the heating source and end users. Heat transportation pipelines are 
installed either above- or under-ground. They are well insulated, in order 
to minimize heat losses. Steam from low-pressure turbines is usually used 
for the base heat load, while steam from high-pressure turbines is used, 
when needed, to meet the peak heat demand. The portion of steam 
retrieved for heat production represents a part of the total steam produced 
by the reactor, the remaining portion of the steam being used to produce 
electricity (IAEA, 2002). In principle, any portion of the heat can be 
extracted from co-generation reactors as district heat, subject to design 
limitations. Co-generation plants, when forming part of large industrial 
complexes, can be readily integrated into an electrical grid system to 
supply any surplus generated. In turn, they would serve as a back-up for 
the assurance of the energy supply. This guarantees a high degree of 
flexibility (IAEA, 2007). Correct function of interface equipment is an 
important basis for good operating performance. Operating experiences of 
interface equipment for nuclear district heating are not different from those 
in commercial thermal plants (except for the radioactivity monitoring 
devices) (IAEA, 1998). 
Figure 14 depicts a simplified scheme of nuclear district heating. Its 
principal components are the nuclear reactor (1), the supply of steam to the 
turbine (2), the turbine unit (3), the supply of feed-water to the reactor (4) 
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Figure 14 – Nuclear district heating concept (Kutznetsov, 2008) 
 
 
Technical requirements for nuclear district heating 
 
Required temperatures 
District heating systems are supplied with steam or hot water in a typical 
temperature range of 80-150 °C (IAEA, 2007). 
 
Suitable reactors 
From the technical point of view, nuclear reactors are basically heat-
generating devices. There is plenty of experience of using nuclear heat in 
district heating, so the technical aspects can be considered well proven. 
There are no technical impediments to the application of nuclear reactors 
as the heat source for district heating. In principle, any type and size of 
nuclear reactor can be used for these purposes. Thus, all existing reactor 
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temperature) are potentially applicable to cogeneration for district heating 
(IAEA, 2007). 
 
Distance from the user 
Due to high losses over longer transmission distances, the heat source 
must be relatively close to the customer, typically within 10-15 km (IAEA, 
2007). In commercial scale heating networks, the transportation distances 
are usually less than 10 km, in most cases between 3 and 6 km (IAEA, 
1998). Anyway, in some cases the heat source can be located further from 
the customer (up to 100 km) depending on the economics based on the size 
of the plant and the level of insulation technology (OECD/NEA, 2004). 
Heat losses along the network can be extremely reduced if pre-insulated 
pipes are utilized: a typical results is a 3% loss on the transported power 
(0.1°C/km, if the temperature difference between feed and return is 15°C 
along a 5 km network). The maximum loss is about 1°C/km. (RENAEL, 
2004). 
The impact of the distance on heat transportation cost is given in table 10, 
where the cost of a 5-km-transfer is taken as a base. The distance between 
the nuclear power plant and the user is not a problem in terms of heat 
losses, but the cost of heat transportation grows linearly with the distance: 
thus, it should be minimized in order to reduce transmission costs. 
 
 









The district heat generation capacities are determined by the collective 
demands of the customers. In large cities an installed capacity of 600-1200 
MWth is normal, while the demand is much lower in towns and small 
communities (10 to 50 MWth). Large capacities of 3000-4000 MWth are 
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Load factor 
 
The annual load factor is normally not higher than 50%, since heat is 
supplied only in the colder part of the year. This is still way below what is 
needed for base load operation of plants. (IAEA, 2007). The annual load 
factor can increase if the distribution of sanitary hot water is provided. 
 
Expected availability of a heat distribution network 
District heat involves the supply of space heating and hot water through a 
district heating system, which consists of heat plants (producing electricity 
simultaneously) and a network of distribution and return pipes. Thus, the 
availability of a heat distribution network plays an important role in the 
prospect of nuclear district heating development. (IAEA, 2007) 
 
Availability factor 
The experience shows that availability factors of 70%, 80% or even 90% 
can be achieved (similar to the availabilities achieved by fossil fuelled 
power plants). The frequency and duration of unplanned outages can be 
kept very low with good preventive and predictive maintenance, but not 
eliminated: consequently, redundancy is needed. Multiple-unit co-
generation power plants, modular design, or backup heat sources are 
necessary to achieve the required availabilities. (IAEA, 2007) 
 
Backup capacity 
To ensure a reliable supply of heat to the residences served by the district 
heat network, adequate backup heat generating capacity is required. This 
implies the need for redundancy and generating unit sizes: at least two 
nuclear power units, or a combination of nuclear and fossil fired units, 
corresponding to only a fraction of the overall peak load (Csik, 1997). 
 
Heat storage 
Heat storage allows a matching of the heat supply to the heat demand. 
Today there are many examples of short-term storage, for instance, on the 
daily scale that relies on hot water accumulator tanks. In the future, more 
innovative concepts for long-term storage facilities may be realized, such 
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Safety 
Potential radioactive contamination of the district heating networks is 
avoided by appropriate measures. No incident involving radioactive 
contamination has ever been reported for any of the reactors used for these 
purposes (Csik, 1997). Because of the need to site the source close to the 
customer, nuclear safety is very important. It is not only required that the 
level of safety is technically sufficient, it is also necessary that the 
adequacy of safety be sufficiently proved to the public and confirmed by 
the licensing process. (IAEA, 2002). 
 
Concluding remarks 
 All existing reactor types are potentially applicable to 
cogeneration with district heating purposes, and several European 
countries already have experience in nuclear district heating for 
residential, agricultural and commercial sector: thus, nuclear 
district heating is technically feasible; 
 Nuclear district heating can compete economically in densely 
populated areas with individual heating arrangements. Economic 
studies generally indicate that district heating costs from nuclear 
power are in the same range as costs associated with fossil-fuelled 
plants, but a site-specific comparison of the cost of nuclear heat 
production with those of competing technologies is necessary; 
 Nuclear district heating offers the possibility of strongly reducing 
air pollution in urban areas: the full integration of external costs in 
the nuclear case would render nuclear district heating the most 
attractive option in economic terms, even compared with 
renewable; 
 There is a major trade-off in siting reactors intended for district 
heating: the site must satisfy both the requirements of the nuclear 
plant (the EPZs require the location of district heating users far 
from the reactor) and of the heat application (low transmission 
costs are achieved if users are located near the reactor); 
 The heat output of a large reactor is far larger than the demands 
likely for district heating; 
 The development of nuclear district heating will be favoured by 
the diffusion of small, modular reactors: low cost, better match of 
the heat demand, enhanced safety, potential to reduce EPZ and 
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2.3 Nuclear process heat 
Process heat implies the supply of heat required for industrial processes 
from several centralized heat generation sites through a steam 
transportation network. Wasted heat from the nuclear reactor can be used 
for this purpose: from a technical point of view, the functioning is similar 
to that of district heating. Thus, most considerations done for district 
heating are valid here. Differences come from the required temperatures 
and the annual load factor, which are both higher. 
 
Technical requirements for nuclear process heat 
Required temperatures 
Within the industrial sector, process heat is used for a very large variety of 
applications with different heat requirements and with temperature ranges 
covering a wide spectrum. The application of nuclear industrial process 
heat is tightly connected to the temperature (Csik, 1997): 
 The lower range, up to about 200 to 300 °C includes industries 
such as seawater desalination, pulp and paper, or textiles; 
 Chemical industries, oil refining, oil shale and sand reprocessing, 
and coal gasification are examples of industries with temperature 
requirements of up to the 500 to 600 °C level; 
 Refinement of coal and lignite, and hydrogen production by water 
splitting are among applications that are renewing the interest and 
they require temperatures between 600 and 1000 °C; 
 The upper range above 1000 °C is dominated by the iron/steel 
industry. 
This section considers only the applications that are feasible with 
commercially developed reactors: that means up to 600 °C (low and 
medium temperature).  
High temperature applications are discussed in section 2.4. A series of 
industrial process at low and medium temperature and their temperature 
ranges are represented in figure 16. 
 
Suitable reactors 
The required heat parameters determine the applicability of different 
reactor types. There are no technical impediments to the application of 
nuclear reactors as heat sources for process heating, thus, all existing 
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depending on the required temperature of the processes (IAEA, 2002). The 
applications of temperature range between 20° C and 600 °C and the 
reactors meeting these requirements are represented in Figure 16. 
However, an important market for nuclear process heat at low temperature 
exists. As illustrated in figure 17, about 30% of the total industrial heat 
demand is required at temperatures below 100°C and 57% at temperatures 
below 400°C. Moreover, in several industrial sectors, such as food, wine 
and beverage, transport equipment, machinery, textile, pulp and paper, the 
share of heat demand at low and medium temperature (below 250°C) is 
about, or even above, 60% of the total figure (ECOHEATCOOL, 2006). 
Figure 16 – Required temperature for industrial processes and reactor types 
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Figure 17 – Share of industrial heat demand by temperature in EU 
(EUROHEATCOOL, 2006) 
 
Distance from the customer 
Due to thermal losses over transportation, the heat source has to be 
relatively close to the customer (IAEA, 2007). Although, this is not as 
critical as it is in district heating systems: since industrial complex are not 
densely populated (on the contrary of residential areas), they can be sited 
more easily near the NPP in order to optimize the trade off 
safety/transmission costs. This would also lead to a better exploitation of 
the EPZ. 
 
Annual load factor 
Since process heat demand does not depend on climatic conditions, the 
supply of industrial heat is more uniform throughout the year than that of 
district heat. The demands of large industrial users usually have base load 
characteristics, with annual load factor of 70-90%. Nuclear reactors, which 
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Needed availability factor 
Almost all industrial users need the assurance of energy supply with a very 
high degree of reliability and availability, approaching 100% in particular 
for large industrial installations and energy intensive processes. The 
average adequate steam supply availabilities for chemical processing and 
oil refineries are respectively 98% and 92% (IAEA, 2007). 
 
Backup capacity 
Most industrial processes require highly reliable heat supply, even though 
some processes (e.g. drying) can also work with interruptible heat supply. 
Industrial heat consumers can be supplied with steam from a multi-unit or 
from a single unit nuclear station. In both cases, one or several backup 
capacity is required. The frequency and duration of unplanned outages can 
be kept very low with good preventive and predictive maintenance. 
Availability and reliability of a reactor, however, can never reach the 
nearly 100% levels required by most large heat users: multiple unit co-
generation power plants, modular designs, or backup heat sources are 
suitable solutions for redundancy (IAEA, 2007). 
 
Safety 
Potential radioactive contamination of the networks is avoided by 
appropriate precautions, such as intermediate heat transport circuits with 
pressure gradients, which act as effective barriers. No incident involving 
radioactive contamination has ever been reported for any of the reactors 
used for these purposes (Csik, 1997). The siting of an industrial heat user 
close to the NPP will require specific safety features appropriate to the 
location and the application (IAEA, 2000). 
 
Market for nuclear process heat 
 
Market fragmentation 
The industrial heat market is highly fragmented, and it is characterized by 
a steady decrease in the number of users as the power requirements 
become higher (IAEA, 2000): 
 about half of the users require less than 10 MWth; 
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 about 99% of the users are included in the range of less than 300 
MWth, which account for about 80% of the total energy 
consumed; 
 individual large users with energy intensive industrial processes 
cover the remaining portion of the industrial heat market with 
requirements up to 1000 MWth, and exceptionally even more. 
Thus, the large-scale introduction of heat distribution system supplied 
from a centralized nuclear heat source need the presence or the 
development a sort of industrial park, where several users are 
concentrated. 
 
Process heat users: main industries 
Generally, the industries that are main consumers of heat are: 
 Petroleum and coal processing; 
 Chemical and fertilizers; 
 Primary metal; 
 Paper and products; 
 Food and products; 
The apportionment varies from country to country, but the chemical and 
petroleum industries are the largest consumers worldwide. These would be 
key target clients for possible applications of nuclear energy (IAEA, 
2002).  
Market size does not matter for nuclear penetration. The main question is 
whether nuclear technologies can prove to be competitive. The market for 
industrial heat is highly competitive. Heat is produced predominantly from 




Worldwide experiences in nuclear process heat 
There is experience in providing process heat for industrial purposes with 
nuclear energy in Canada, Germany, Norway, Switzerland and India. New 
plants are being designed in Russia, the Republic of Korea and Canada 
(IAEA, 2007). The most significant examples of nuclear process heat are 









































PWR 1979 970 (1) 45 220/100 
Cardboard 
factory 
India (Kota) CANDU 1980 160 (1) 85 250 D2O 
Table 13 – Experiences in industrial process heat applications (adapted from 
(IAEA, 2007)) 
 
Both for the number of different users served and for the huge quantity of 
thermal power supplied, the most synergic plant is the Bruce Energy 
Centre in Canada, where steam is used for heavy water production plants 
and for an adjacent industrial park. It is the world’s largest nuclear 
steam/electricity generating complex. It includes eight CANDU nuclear 
reactors with a total output of over 7.200 MWe, the world’s largest heavy 
water plant. The initial development focused primarily on agriculture-
based industry. Then, a sustainable development model was presented, 
with the aim of demonstrate commercial application of “closed loop” and 
integrated systems, the introduction of nuclear hydrogen and absorption of 
CO2. The sustainable development model is based on the following points 
(IAEA, 2000): 
 Cogeneration of electricity and process steam using a nuclear 
reactor; 
 A menu of feedstocks ranging from farm produced carbo-hydrates 
and solid wastes to low grade carbon sources and carbon dioxide; 
 A series of state of the art processing, synthesizing and refining 
processes; 
 End products that have markets and in their own right have 
environmental value-added. 
The six private industries currently established in the park are (IAEA, 
2007): a plastic film manufacturer, a 30.000 mq greenhouse, a 12 million 
liter/year ethanol plant, a 200.000 ton/year alfalfa dehydration, cubing and 
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Siting and construction 
Similar to nuclear district heating, the close siting of a nuclear plant to the 
customer is preferable, as the heat transportation costs grow significantly 
with distance. On the contrary of residential complexes, industrial process 
heat users do not have to be located within highly populated areas. Many 
of the process heat users, in particular the large ones, can be, and usually 
are, located outside urban areas, often at considerable distances. This 
makes joint siting of nuclear reactors and industrial users of process heat 
not only viable, but also desirable in order to drastically reduce the heat 
transport costs, provided that the co-siting does not adversely affect the 
safety case for the nuclear installation (IAEA, 2000). In Germany and 
Switzerland there have been experiences with nuclear process heat and the 
distances from the industries were respectively 1.5 km (the PWR of Stade 
for a salt refinery) and 2 km (the Goesgen PWR for a cardboard factory) 
(OECD/NEA, 2004). Installing a new nuclear co-generation plant close to 
existing and interested industrial users has better prospects. Even better 
would be a joint project whereby both the nuclear co-generation plant and 
the industrial installation requiring process heat are planned, designed, 
built and operated together as an integrated complex (IAEA, 2007). 
 
 
The role of SMRs in nuclear process heat 
Coupling a large reactor with a small industrial facility does not allow a 
significant exploitation of heat from the reactor. The only chance to use a 
relevant fraction of the available heat from a large reactor is a large 
industrial complex requiring a high quantity of steam for different 
businesses (e.g. Bruce Eco Industrial Park in Canada, see section 
Worldwide experiences in nuclear process heat). Moreover, the EPZ 
around a NPP could be so large that the location of a lot of industries is not 
only viable, but also preferable in order to exploit this unused area. Such a 
kind of multi-business industrial park is quite difficult to implement, as it 
requires an extremely accurate choice of businesses and the presence of 
interested investors. 
The reasoning could be inverted as well: if a high demand of heat is 
difficult to find, it is possible to reduce the offer. In this sense, the 
diffusion of small, innovative reactors with lower power and less EPZ 
requirements, could increase the attractiveness of coupling the nuclear 
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According to this, the development of nuclear process heat applications 
could depend on the development of SMRs. For large size reactors used in 
co-generation mode, electricity would always constitute the main product. 
Such plants, therefore, have to be integrated into the electrical grid system 
and optimized for electricity production. For reactors in the SMR size 
range, and in particular for small and very small reactors, the share of 
process heat generation would be larger, and heat could even be the 
predominant product. This would affect the plant optimization criteria, and 
could present much more attractive conditions to the potential process heat 
user. Consequently, the prospects of SMRs as co-generation plants 
supplying electricity and process heat are considerably better than those of 
large reactors (IAEA, 2007). 
 
Conclusions about nuclear process heat 
 All existing reactor types and sizes are potentially applicable to 
producing process heat, depending on the required temperature of 
the processes; 
 Process heat has base load characteristics, as well as nuclear 
reactors: the matching between demand and supply is better than 
in the district heating case; 
 The siting issue is not as critical as it is for district heating, 
because industrial complexes do not require high population 
density and they can be located near the NPP (i.e. inside the EPZ). 
This would lead to a better exploitation of the EPZ; 
 The industrial process heat market is highly fragmented (few large 
users, lot of small users) and it is difficult to find such demanding 
users that can harness a significant amount of the heat supplied by 
a large reactor. Thus, there are two options to favour the 
utilization of nuclear heat for industrial processes: 
1. The concentration of small industrial users in so-called 
industrial parks to match the demand and the supply: if 
the interaction between NPP and other plants is proven to 
be safe, they can be located inside the EPZ; 
2. The large-scale commercialization of small reactors; 
In the first case, a joint project, whereby both the nuclear co-
generation plant and the industrial installations requiring process 
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2.4  High temperature applications 
The feasibility of high-temperature applications exploiting nuclear heat is 
dependent upon the commercialization of nuclear reactors operating at 
adequate temperature, which is envisaged in about 10-30 years, depending 
on the technology (WNA, 2009). The technology of some high-
temperature processes discussed in this section is not yet mature as well 
(e.g. thermo-chemical H2 production), despite their advanced stage of 
development and the confidence of international literature. For these 
reasons high-temperature applications are characterized by a higher level 
of uncertainty than low-temperature ones. High temperature applications 
are divided into traditional ones (process heat at high temperature) and 
innovative ones. Traditional applications will not be discussed in depth, as 
information given in the previous section about low temperature process 
heat apply to them as well. The only difference lies in the temperature, 
therefore in the reactor and, as a consequence, in the technology 
availability, which is supposed to be due in about 2030. Our choice is to 
give relevance to innovative applications. All high temperature reactors 
are small, innovative reactors of Generation IV, thus it makes sense to 
hypothesize a small EPZ for the applications. 
Considerations referred to low temperature process heat are similar to high 
temperature traditional applications. Here, the development of the 
applications is bound to the development of HTGR. In order to show the 
potential use of high temperature reactors for industrial steam supply, the 
following figure presents the different temperatures required by some 
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Figure 19Temperature required by some industrial processes at high 
temperature (adapted from (IAEA, 2007), (IAEA, 1998) and (IAEA, 2002)) 
 
2.4.1 Gasification via nuclear heat 
Gasification is a means to convert fossil fuels, biomass and wastes into 
either a combustible gas or a synthesis gas for subsequent utilization 
(Minchener, 2005), consisting primarily of hydrogen (H2) and carbon 
monoxide (CO). The oxidant used can be air, pure oxygen, steam or a 
mixture of these gases (Ciferno & Marano, 2002). Under an economic 
point of view, the gasification process converts solid or liquid feedstock of 
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that is suitable for use in electricity production or for the manufacture of 
chemicals, hydrogen, or transportation fuels (Stiegel & Maxwell, 2001). 
Technological options 
There are three gasifier configurations, described below: they differ in 
flow geometry and in process parameters such as temperature and 
pressure. 
1. Moving bed gasifiers (also called fixed bed g.) have been the 
traditional choice for gasification. Gases flow relatively slowly 
upward through the bed of feedstock material (Minchener, 2005); 
depending on the direction of the airflow, moving bed gasifiers 
are further classified as updraft, downdraft or cross-flow, and each 
class is characterized by different operating temperatures 
(McKendry, 2002) (see table 14); 
2. Fluidized bed gasifiers, in which feedstock particles are 
suspended in the gas flow, and the material entering the gasifier is 
mixed with that already undergoing gasification. Two main kinds 
of fluidized bed gasifiers are in use: circulating fluidized bed g. 
and bubbling bed g. (McKendry, 2002) (see table 14). 
3. Entrained flow gasifiers, in which pulverized coal particles and 
gases flow concurrently at high speed. They are the most 
commonly used gasifiers for coal gasification (Minchener, 2005), 
but the need for a finely divided feed material (<0.1–0.4 mm) 
creates problems for fibrous materials such as wood, thus making 
the process unsuitable for most biomass materials (McKendry, 
2002). 
 
Gasifier configuration Operating temperature [°C] 
Moving bed gasifier 1000 
Fluidized bed gasifier 900 
Entrained flow gasifier 1200-1600 
 
Table 14 – Gasifier operating temperatures (Minchener, 2005) 
 
All gasifier configurations require air, oxygen or steam at high 
temperatures (McKendry, 2002) (see Table 14): this prevents their 
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Feedstock 
Gasification can be operated either with biomass or coal as a feedstock, 
each having different characteristics, availability and costs: 
1. Gasification of biomass: biomass is the organic material from recently 
living things, including plant matter from trees, grasses, and 
agricultural crops (Ciferno & Marano, 2002). The chemical 
composition of biomass varies among species, but basically consists 
of high moisture content, a fibrous structure consisting of lignin, 
carbohydrates or sugars, and ash- Biomass possesses a heating value 
lower than that of coal (see Table 15), and it is very non-homogeneous 
in its natural state: this non-homogeneous character poses difficulties 
in maintaining constant feed rates to gasification units, often resulting 
in a low heating value for the product syngas, typically <2.5 MJ/m3 
(Ciferno & Marano, 2002); to be considered interchangeable with 
conventional fossil fuels and to ensure maximum flexibility for 
industrial or utility applications, the syngas heating value needs to be 
above 11 MJ/m3 (the heating value for natural gas being 
approximately 37 MJ/m3) (Turn, 1999). 
 




Corn cob 17 
Short rotation woody crops 
Beech wood 18,4 




Municipal solid waste 




Table 15 – Potential biomass gasifier feedstock and heating value 
(Ciferno & Marano, 2002) 
2. Gasification of coal: coal gasification involves converting solid 
coal into a gaseous fuel that can be used similarly to natural gas; 
the objective of the conversion is to mitigate some of the 





49          G. Locatelli and M. Mancini 
2010). In particular, gasification allows a significant reduction of 
air emissions from the direct combustion of coal (e.g. particulates, 
sulphur oxides and heavy metals). An important advantage of coal 
gasification is that of the resource base. In general, the use of 
gasified coal has the same advantages as the use of natural gas, 
but the world current reserves of coal are much larger than those 
of natural gas; 
3. Co-gasification of coal and biomass: biomass, whether as a 
dedicated crop or a waste-derived material, is renewable. 
However, the availability of a continuous biomass supply can be 
problematic (for example, crop supply may be decreased by poor 
weather or by alternative uses, and the availability of a waste 
material can fluctuate depending on variations in people’s 
behavior)  (Komabe, Hanaoka, & Fujimoto, 2007). The principle 
of co-gasification is to adjust the amount of coal fed to the gasifier 
so as to alleviate biomass feedstock fluctuations. Co-gasification 
is a new area of study, and only pilot studies are being carried on. 
 
Products and applications 
Different outputs of the gasification process are listed and described 
below: 
1. Gasification can create Substitute Natural Gas (SNG) from 
coal or other feedstock: using a “methanation" reaction, the 
SNG - chiefly carbon monoxide (CO) and hydrogen (H2) - can 
be then profitably converted to methane (CH4) (Mozaffarian, 
Zwart, Boerrigter, & Deurwaarder, 2004); 
2. Gasification can generate power directly: gasification can 
produce electric power via a direct combustion boiler/steam 
turbine: this system has a low efficiency (between 20 and 25%) 
(Ciferno & Marano, 2002). Power generation can also be 
accomplished via gasification of biomass, followed by a 
combustion engine, combustion turbine, steam turbine or fuel 
cell. These systems can produce both heat and power and can 
achieve greater system efficiencies, in the range of 30 to 40%. 
If the feedstock is coal, the Integrated Gasification Combined 
Cycle (IGCC) is the baseline choice: this particular coal-to-





50          G. Locatelli and M. Mancini 
high level of air emissions associated with conventional coal-
burning technologies. In contrast, conventional coal 
combustion technologies capture the pollutants after 
combustion, which requires cleaning a much larger volume of 
the exhaust gas, leading to increased costs, reduced reliability, 
and generating large volumes of sulfur-laden wastes that have 
to be disposed (Minchener, 2005); 
3. Gasification can synthesize chemicals and fertilizers: it 
produces valuable byproducts such as ammonia and 
phosphates, that have potential on the fertilizer market (Ro, 
Cantrell, Elliott, & Hunt, 2007); 
4. Gasification can produce H2 for the hydrogen economy: 
production of H2 from renewable sources derived from 
agricultural or other waste streams offers the possibility to 
lower greenhouse gas emissions (without carbon sequestration 
technologies)  (Levin & Chahine, 2009). The key problem with 
gasification is how to separate and purify the H2 from other 
gases in the syngas; the technology is not yet mature for a 
satisfying implementation. 
 
2.4.2 Hydrogen production via nuclear heat 
As an alternative path to the current fossil fuel economy, a hydrogen 
economy is envisaged in which hydrogen would play a major role in 
energy systems and serve all sectors of the economy, substituting for 
fossil fuels (IAEA, 2007). Hydrogen possesses a number of attractive 
features that could allow it to become a key secondary energy carrier in 
the future: 
 Hydrogen combustion (either hot or cold) is generally clean, 
since it does not produce the characteristic emissions of fossil 
fuel combustion. The problem of NOx production from high 
temperature combustion is practically eliminated in modern 
engine designs (Conte, Iacobazzi, Ronchetti, & Vellone, 2001). 
 Technologies similar to those used for the combustion of fossil 
fuels can be used for hydrogen combustion to generate heat, 
electricity and propulsion energy; for example, hydrogen can be 
used as fuel in catalytic combustions (in diffusion burners, fuel 
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 Hydrogen is storable, which is convenient for an energy carrier 
and gives the possibility of making the energy system much 
more flexible than at present, in particular by using the 
conversion of electricity to hydrogen (through water 
electrolysis) and vice versa (through fuel cells), as necessary 
(WNA, 2010). 
 Hydrogen could be a third product from power plants, in 
addition to electricity and heat (Forsberg, 2003). 
Making the fullest possible use of the above advantages, hydrogen can 
be considered a key element of an environmentally benign and 
sustainable energy system, including transportation. 
Market perspectives 
The annual world consumption of H2 is about 50 million tons, which is 
used primarily for ammonia production and conversion of heavier crude 
oils to clean liquid fuels (Forsberg, 2003). The hydrogen market has been 
growing steadily in the last decade, and this growth is expected to continue 
with a 10% yearly rate (Blanchette, 2007), doubling the demand by 2020. 
Moreover, in the long term, should the hydrogen economy occur, the use 
of hydrogen for all our transportation needs would require a factor of 18 
more hydrogen than currently used. Use of hydrogen for all our non-
electric energy needs would imply a factor of 40 increase (Schultz, Brown, 
Besenbruch, & Hamilton, 2003). 
Hydrogen production methods 
Nuclear energy provides a source of heat to produce H2. Multiple 
processes are being investigated to produce H2 from water and heat. If 
nuclear energy is to be used for H2 production, the nuclear reactor must 
deliver heat at conditions that match the requirements imposed by the H2 
production process. The viability of H2 production from nuclear power 
ultimately depends upon the economics, which, in turn, depend upon both 
the proposed methods of H2 production and the available reactors. Four 
methods have been proposed to produce H2 from nuclear power: 
 Electrolysis: electrolysis of water to produce H2 is an old 
technology that is used today to produce ultrapure H2 and to 
produce H2 in small quantities at dispersed sites. Electrolysis is 
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 Steam reforming: today, H2 is produced primarily from the steam 
reforming of natural gas. Steam reforming is an energy-intensive 
endothermic low-pressure process requiring high-temperature heat 
as an input. Natural gas is used as the reduced chemical source of 
H2 and burned to produce heat to drive the process at temperatures 
of up to 900°C. The amount of natural gas required for steam 
reforming can be significantly reduced when heat is provided by a 
nuclear reactor. The Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute is 
currently preparing to demonstrate the production of H2 by steam 
reforming of natural gas with the heat input provided by its High-
Temperature Engineering Test Reactor (HTTR). The nuclear 
power plant provides heat that replaces that from a gas flame. 
Because this system uses standard H2 production technology, it 
represents the near-term nuclear H2 technology, once HTTRs are 
commercially viable (Forsberg, 2003). 
 Hot electrolysis: electrolysis can be operated at high temperatures 
(700–900°C) and low pressures to replace some of the electrical 
input with thermal energy. Because heat is cheaper than 
electricity, the H2 costs via this production method could 
ultimately be lower than those for traditional electrolysis. Equally 
important, the high temperature results in better chemical kinetics 
within the electrolyser that reduces equipment size and 
inefficiencies. However, the technology is at an early stage of 
development although it derives much of its technology from 
solid-oxide fuel cells. Hot electrolysis requires collocation of H2 
production close to the nuclear reactor to provide the heat 
(Forsberg, 2003). 
 Thermo-chemical hydrogen production: hydrogen can be 
produced by direct thermo-chemical processes, in which the net 
reaction is: heat plus water yields H2 and oxygen. These are the 
leading long-term options for production of H2 using nuclear 
energy. For low production costs, however, high temperatures 
(more than 750°C) are required to ensure rapid chemical kinetics 
(i.e., small plant size with low capital costs) and high conversion 
efficiencies. Of the advanced methods for hydrogen generation 
using nuclear power, thermo-chemical cycles have received the 
most attention because current estimates indicate that thermo-
chemical H2 production costs could be as low as 60% of those 
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 Biomass gasification: hydrogen can be produced with lower or no 
greenhouse emissions via the gasification of agricultural or other 
waste (Levin & Chahine, 2009). 
Thermo-chemical processes are currently regarded as the most promising 
technology for massive production of hydrogen in the next decades 
(Forsberg, 2003). 
Process requirements 
Process requirements for H2 production via nuclear steam reforming of 
methane, hot electrolysis, and thermo-chemical cycles are similar. All 
three technologies impose similar requirements on the nuclear reactor 
(Forsberg, 2003): 
 Reactor power: H2 production facilities match best with reactor 
powers below 1000 MWe (Forsberg, 2003), but larger reactor 
scales (such as the 1650 MWe AREVA reactors that are planned 
to be constructed in Italy (WNA, 2009)) do not prevent H2 
production applications. 
 Peak temperature: all the methods previously described (see 
Hydrogen production methods) but electrolysis requires high 
temperature heat (750–900◦C). 
 Temperature range of delivered heat: all of the endothermic high-
temperature chemical reactions operate at a nearly constant 
temperature. Heat should therefore be delivered over a small 
temperature range. 
 Pressure: the chemical reactions go to completion at low 
pressures. High pressures reverse the desired chemical reactions. 
The H2-nuclear interface should be at low pressure to minimize 
the risk of pressurization of the chemical plant and minimize 
high-temperature materials strength requirements. 
 Isolation: the nuclear and chemical facilities should be isolated 
from each other so that upsets in one facility do not impact the 
other. The system must also minimize tritium (radioactive 
hydrogen) production and transport from the reactor to the H2 
production facility. 
Nuclear reactor selection 
The high peak temperatures reached by all the processes (750-900°C, see 
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currently commercialized reactors (WNA, 2009); therefore, although 
several methods to produce H2 using high temperature heat are available, 
significant development work is required before any of these processes can 
be actually put in practice. 
Sandia National Laboratories evaluated various nuclear reactors for their 
ability to provide the high temperature heat needed, and to be interfaced 
safely and economically to the hydrogen production process (Schultz, 
Brown, Besenbruch, & Hamilton, 2003). The recommended reactor 
technologies were supposed to require minimal development to meet the 
high temperature requirement and also to be free from any significant 
design, safety, operational or economic issues. 
The following conclusions were drawn: 
 PWR, BWR and organic-cooled reactors: not recommended, 
because they cannot achieve sufficiently high temperatures. 
 Liquid-core and alkali metal-cooled reactors: they imply serious 
development risk, due to material concerns at the needed 
temperatures. 
 Heavy metal and molten salt-cooled reactors: promising, but they 
require a significant development effort. 
 Gas-core reactors: not recommended, too speculative at present. 
 High-temperature gas-cooled reactors: baseline choice. In 
particular, only modest development is needed for helium gas-
cooled reactor, which has historically been considered the one 
reactor that would be used for the purpose. Alternatively, a reactor 
can be designed specifically for H2 production: the Advanced 
High-Temperature Reactor (AHTR) has been proposed; this 
concept is similar under many features (core design, fuel cycle) to 
the General Atomics modular helium reactor (Forsberg, 2003). 
Economics of H2 production 
Nuclear power plants are characterized by high capital costs and low 
operating costs; therefore, the economics are strongly dependent upon 
maintaining base-load operations with continuous output. Two 
characteristics of hydrogen help doing so: 
 Constant base-load demand for H2 favors technologies with low 
fuel costs, such as nuclear energy (Forsberg & Peddicord, 2001). 
 Hydrogen packing (increasing the pressure) creates significant 
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demand; using the techniques developed by the natural gas 
industry, H2 storage in large volumes is expected to be relatively 
low cost (Forsberg, 2003). 
In addition, the need for security, the difficulty in finding social 
acceptance for nuclear plants and the economic advantages of using 
common facilities encourage siting multiple reactors at each site. 
Economics of H2 distribution 
Hydrogen transport is the major concern for the accomplishment of the 
hydrogen economy: if the hydrogen economy occurs as is prefigured, the 
scale of H2 production is expected to evolve from distributed to midsize 
and only eventually (after 2030) to centralized.  
Central station plants are assumed to have a production capacity of 
1.200.000 kilograms per day (kg/d) and to operate with a 90 percent or 
higher capacity factor, therefore producing on average 1.080.000 kg/d H2 
and supporting nearly 2 million cars; midsize plants are assumed to have a 
production capacity of 24,000 kg/d (operating with a 90 percent capacity 
factor, they produce on average 21,600 kg/d H2 which is enough to support 
about 40.000 cars); distributed plants have different production capacities 
corresponding to the differing capacity factors: those that operate with a 90 
percent capacity factor are assumed to have a production capacity of 480 
kg/d H2, producing on average 432 kg/d (Committee on Alternatives and 
Strategies for Future Hydrogen Production and Use, 2004). 
The nuclear energy source is only compatible, for the number and size of 
plants, with centralized production (Committee on Alternatives and 
Strategies for Future Hydrogen Production and Use, 2004). If no 
breakthrough technologies are conceived, dedicated pipelines will be the 
most convenient solution for the transport of hydrogen from central station 
plants to users; line transmission of hydrogen, although, is expected to be 
highly capital-intensive, because costly steel and valve metal seal 
connections will be required in order to avoid long-term embrittlement and 
possibilities of leakage. According to the analysis conducted by the 
Committee on Alternatives and Strategies for Future Hydrogen Production 
and Use, pipeline shipment and dispensing will cost $0.96/kg H2, which is 
essentially equal to the cost of H2 production from natural gas, and higher 
than the cost of its production via thermal splitting with nuclear energy. 
If and when extensive new hydrogen transmission pipelines are needed in 
the decades ahead, research in such areas as lower-cost pipeline materials, 
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optimization, and even pipeline emplacement technologies will be of 
critical importance. 
 
2.4.3 Shale oil extraction 
If carbon dioxide releases from liquid-fuels production are to be 
minimized, liquid fuels should be produced only from high-quality light 
crude oils; unfortunately, the resources of light crude oil are limited 
(Forsberg, 2009). What is required is a technology to create large 
quantities of light crude oil without the release of large quantities of 
greenhouse gases: one option is a nuclear light-oil production system 
(Forsberg, 2008). This system may allow massive underground resources 
of fossil fuels, which are economically unrecoverable with existing 
technologies, to be converted into liquid fuels (Forsberg, 2009). Examples 
include the following: 
 Old oil fields: over half the oil remains in a depleted oil field 
trapped by capillary forces between grains of sand or within 
cracks in the rock (Forsberg, 2009). 
 Tar sands: tar sands are a mixture of sand, clay, water, and 
bitumen (viscous heavy oil). Unlike conventional oil, bitumen is 
too viscous to be pumped to the surface. The feasibility of oil 
recovery from tar sands is limited to surface deposits and 
underground deposits where steam heating can reduce the 
viscosity of the oil until it flows (Finan, Miu, & Kadak, 2005). 
 Oil shale: oil shales are fine-grained sedimentary rocks containing 
relatively large amounts of organic matter (known as ‘kerogen’) 
from which significant amounts of shale oil and combustible gas 
can be extracted (World Energy Council, 2007); shale oil, when 
adequately processed, can be utilized as a crude oil substitute in 
most applications (Ots, 2007). 
 Soft coal: soft coal, if heated, is converted to chat and a liquid 
fuel. 
The extraction of oil from these categories of fossil deposits poses a 
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Shale oil reserves in the world 
World shale oil resources1 derivable from oil shale beds are estimated by 
the European Academies Science Advisory Council (EASAC) at 
approximately 3.2 trillion US barrels (EASAC, 2007). Two-thirds of the 
listed deposits are located in North America, while Europe accounts for 
approximately 12%. The Russian territory holds more than 60% of 
European oil shale, and the Italian peninsula contains most of the 
remaining quantity (about 20% of the total, see Figure 20) (EASAC, 
2007).  
 
Shale oil extraction technologies 
The two classes of shale oil recovery are surface mining, which is the 
traditional means to extract shale oil from oil shale, and in-situ refining.
  
Surface mining 
Surface mining is operated through an open-pit recovery of oil shale with 
heavy-ton trucks and electric or hydraulic shovels; the ore is then sent to 
an extraction plant where the rock is separated from the kerogen, which 
undergoes a refining process (see Figure 21, left side: traditional refining) 
(Finan, Miu, & Kadak, 2005). 
In-situ refining 
Starting in the 1970s, researchers began to examine methods for 
underground oil recovery from the previously described fossil deposits; 
because of technological developments, concerns about greenhouse gas 
and CO2 emissions, and higher oil prices, these technologies have now 
progressed to field testing, with initial leasing of properties for commercial 
production in pioneer countries with large oil shale reserves (Forsberg, 
2008). 
 
                                                        
 
1  Resources also comprehend those quantities of a commodity that are estimated to be 
potentially recoverable but which are not currently considered commercially 
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Figure 21 – Distillation and thermal cracking of high-molecular-weight 
hydrocarbons in a refinery and in an underground reservoir (Forsberg, 2009). 
 
The technology is conceptually simple (see Figure 21, right side: In-situ 
refining): a fossil deposit is heated to temperatures around 370°C through 
the injection of high-temperature heat at 700°C from the heater well); as 
the temperature increases, any volatile hydrocarbons will vaporize (be 
distilled), move as gases toward a recovery well, condenses in the 
surrounding cooler zones, and be pumped out of the ground as a liquid or 
vapor (Forsberg, 2009). This distillation process leaves most impurities 
behind; as the temperature further increases, heavier hydrocarbons that 
have not been vaporized will be thermally cracked and turn into lighter 
volatile hydrocarbons, that can be recovered. 
This process has two major technical advantages: 
 Ability to extract deep-situated resources: approximately 80% of 
the oil shale deposits worldwide are too deep for surface mining 
and can only be recovered with in-situ methods (Finan, Miu, & 
Kadak, 2005); 
 Control of carbon dioxide emissions: unlike in traditional refining, 
the solids from an underground thermal-cracking process remain 
sequestered underground as carbon (Forsberg, 2009); if the heat 
was provided by an energy source that did not emit carbon 
dioxide as well, such as nuclear heat the result would be low 
emissions of carbon dioxide from the entire process, since a high-
quality crude oil is distilled that requires little added refining to 
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Nuclear energy as a source of heat for in-situ shale oil recovery 
The shale oil heating process requires large quantities of high-temperature 
heat - about one-sixth the heating value of the product (IAEA, 1997). The 
heating of oil shale yields both liquids and gases (Forsberg, 2009); it is 
currently proposed to burn the gases, representing one-third of the 
recovered energy, to produce electricity, that is in turn converted into heat 
for further underground heating (Forsberg, 2009). This solution implies 
the release of greenhouse gases produced during the gas combustion. 
Although, a heating option exists that can maintain the process a 
greenhouse-free one: the use of high-temperature nuclear reactors to 
produce the required heat (see figure 22) (IAEA, 1997). 
 
Figure 22 – Configuration for underground heating of oil shale via nuclear 
heat (Forsberg, 2009). 
 
Heat from nuclear plants guarantees two main advantages when compared 
to heat from the combustion of oil shale gases: 
 It erases the necessity to burn part of the products to generate 
heat, substituting it with bleeded heat; the thermal energy cost in 
thus substantially decreased. 
 It avoids emissions of carbon dioxide throughout the production 
process. 
 
(Forsberg, 2006) identifies nuclear heat as a potentially viable thermal 
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deposits: they are more than 200m thick and can yield up to 625 million 
barrels of oil per km2. This means the concentrated layout of American 
shale-oil deposits make it practical and economically viable to transfer 
heat over limited distances from a reactor to the deposit.  
 
Economics 
There is uncertainty about the commercial viability of shale oil as a crude 
oil substitute: the 2005 study Oil Shale Development in the United States: 
Prospects and Policy Issues, (RAND, 2005), indicates that oil production 
based on in-situ refining can be profitable if crude oil prices consistently 
stay above at least $50 per barrel; the current price of crude oil is about 80 
dollars per barrel, but the time horizon for the commercial development of 
in-situ technologies is more than 20 years (RAND, 2005); the oil price 
forecast is not reliable on such a long term, due to uncertainties in the 
development of crude oil consumption, extraction technologies, oil 
substitutes, and to the political instability of supplier countries. 
Nuclear heat can make in-situ refining more economically competitive: the 
state-of-the-art Shell in-situ retorting process uses electric power as the 
source for down-hole heating; about 250 to 300 kilowatt-hours are 
required for down-hole heating per barrel of extracted product (RAND, 
2005). Assuming electricity at $0.05 per kilowatt-hour, power costs for 
heating using electrically-generated heat amount to between $12 and $15 
per barrel (crude oil equivalent). Assuming nuclear power as a cost-zero 
source of heat, in-situ refining via nuclear heat could become competitive 
with crude oil prices above 35 to 38 dollars per barrel, which is less than 
half the current market price. Of course, the commercial development of 
in-situ technology will require high investments: Shell reports that it has 
spent tens of million dollars in developing its in-situ conversion 
technology, and that a pre-commercial demonstration plant that would 
produce about 1,000 barrels per day will cost additional 200 million 
dollars (RAND, 2005). Further investments would be needed to reach a 
mature, commercially viable technology. 
 
Environmental considerations 
If the economic feasibility of shale oil production is verified, there are 
issues that need to be reckoned on the environmental front, including 
(EASAC, 2007): 
 Land use: large tracts of public land would need to handed over to 
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concomitant requirement of infrastructures: roads, power supply 
and distribution systems, pipelines, water storage and supply 
facilities; In-situ retorting would be less disruptive to the 
landscape than open-pit mining, nonetheless it would involve the 
drilling of a large number of wells. Due to the poor flow 
conditions within the shale, the wells would have to be drilled 
close to each other; the wells would need to be connected to an 
shale oil and gas treatment plant by a network of pipelines 
(RAND, 2005); 
 Water quality: potential sources of water pollution include mine 
drainage, point-source discharges from surface operations 
associated with solids handling, retorting, upgrading, and plant 
utilities; there is little understanding of the long-term impact of 
the underground liquefaction and gasification on groundwater 
quality, but it is envisaged to be a very disruptive one; 
 Water consumption: estimated water requirements for mining and 
retorting range from 2.1 to 5.2 barrels of water per barrel of shale 
oil product; in-situ processing eliminates or reduces a number of 
these water requirements, but it would still require a considerable 
use of water for oil and gas extraction, post-extraction cooling, 
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2.5 Conclusions 
Three main dimensions affect the development of the applications 
described in par 2: 
1. Temperature required: low, medium or high; 
2. Reactor size: traditional, large ones or small innovative 
ones; 
3. EPZ size: small or large. 
The main conclusions about possible applications, in relationship with 
these aspects, are discussed in Table 18. 
The hypothesized influence of the EPZ on the different applications can be 
schematized as follows: 
 If the application considered is at low temperature and the reactor 
is a large, traditional one, the EPZ is hypothesized to be large and 
must be exploited in some way.  
 If the application temperature is low, but the reactor is a small, 
innovative one (e.g. IRIS), the EPZ will be probably reduced or 
even collapsed in the NPP on-site area. Thus, the influence of 
EPZ in this case is not a major constraint; 
  The same consideration is valid for high temperature 
applications: they all envisage Generation IV reactors, for which 
the reduction of EPZ is a goal announced by GIF and INPRO. 
These observations are schematized in Figure 29. 
However it is not possible to assume the EPZ reduction for small reactors 
as a certainty. Even though the EPZ for these reactors is likely to be small, 











Near term applications requiring low temperatures can be 
realized by commercial nuclear reactors, such as LWR and 
PHWR. 
Applications at medium temperature could be realized with 
gas reactors like AGR. However, the chapter will not focus 
on them for the following reasons: 
 They are generation II reactors and it is unlikely to 
invest on them; 
 There is no experience (and literature) in heat 
applications from them. 
Long term applications at high and very high temperature 
are highly innovative and constitute a major field of study: 
the commercialization of HTGR is envisaged for 2030. 
Reactor 
size 
Near term applications at low temperature can be realized 
using both large and small reactors. In particular, large 
reactors of generation III and III+ are available, while the 
commercialization of small, innovative reactors is 
envisaged for 2016. There is a lot of experience and 
literature about nuclear heat applications at low 
temperature using traditional reactors. 
Long term applications, requiring high and very high 
temperature, are mainly addressed to small reactors such as 
Generation IV VHTR (2030). 
EPZ size 
Only district heating is strongly influenced by the EPZ size, 
as it requires a high density of people relatively near the 
reactor. If a large reactor is used, the NPP will be probably 
located far from the population centre which harnesses the 
heat, due to EPZ constraints: in this case, a way to exploit 
the unused area around the plant must be found. If a small, 
innovative reactor with enhanced safety is used, the EPZ 
could be reduced or even eliminated: however, this is not a 
certainty. 
All other applications are not highly influenced by EPZ as 
they do not require a large amount of people near the plant: 
on the contrary, it makes sense to assume that they can be 
located inside the EPZ, avoiding long and expensive heat 
transmission lines, and allowing the exploitation of the 
unused area around the plant. 
In order to reduce/eliminate EPZ, the option to locate the 
NPP offshore is very interesting. 
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Large & traditional 
(Generation III and III+) 
Small & Innovative 
(Generation III+ and IV) 
High influence of EPZ: how 
to exploit unused areas? 
 Energy crops 
 Renewable 
 Industrial Parks 
 
Low influence of EPZ: 
applications could be co-
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